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Weapon by a Restricted Person, a felony in the Second Degree,
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presiding.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
Case No. 20560

ORLANDO F. ROYBAL,
Defendant/Appellant

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed
by the Court on February 20, 1986.

Originally, this case was

an appeal from a conviction and judgment imposed for Possession
of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a felony of the
Second Degree, in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson,
Judge, presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Appellant at
1-3.
ARGUMENT
In its opinion, State v. Roybal, 28 Utah Adv. Rep. 9
(filed February 20, 1986), this Court has misapprehended issues
of fact and law.
Mr. Roybal was convicted on the basis of evidence (a
gun) discovered during a frisk by a police officer of Mr.
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Roybal after Mr. Roybal had phoned police concerning a
suspicious vehicle.
The Court's opinion correctly states that, pursuant to
statute , a peace officer may frisk a person for dangerous
weapons when the officer reasonably believes he or another
person is in danger. icl

at 9.

The opinion further states that

before such a frisk can occur, the officer must have a
reasonable belief that the person may be armed and dangerous
and that the belief must be based on "specific and articulable
facts."

J[d. The opinion then enumerates seven facts which it

claims were known to the officer in this case before he frisked
Mr. Roybal. JEd. at 10. However, an examination of the record
shows that no nexus existed between the officer's knowledge and
the search of Mr. Roybal.

In particular, the opinion is

mistaken as to one critical fact —

the officer's knowledge of

the identity of the suspect before the frisk.
The opinion states that the officer knew the identity
of Mr. Roybal before the frisk because "4. Defendant
approached the officer and identified himself as Orlando
Roybal."

The record does not support this conclusion.

Officer

Mitchell repeatedly testified, under questioning from defense
counsel, the prosecutor, and Judge Wilkinson, that at the time
of the frisk Mitchell had no idea that the man he was frisking
was Orlando Roybal (T. 24,25,41).

The State claims in its

brief that Mr. Roybal identified himself before the frisk
(State brief at 7-8). But according to the testimony of
Officer Mitchell, this was not true.

Officer Mitchell was
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adamant that he did not know the identity of Mr, Roybal before
he frisked Mr. Roybal.

For example, the following exchange

occurred between Judge Wilkinson and the officer:
THE COURT: Let me just ask you Officer.
As you approached the—as this individual
approached you, you did not know him?
THE WITNESS:

That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: And you did not know that he
had been in jail?
THE WITNESS:

I had no idea who he was.

(T. 41).
The officer's knowledge of the identity of the suspect
before the search is a critical factor in the determination of
the legality of the search in this case.

The officer's own

testimony, supported by that of another officer at the scene
(T. 55) clearly indicates he did not know the identity of the
suspect at the time of the frisk.

Therefore, the search was

not justifiable as a search of a known, and suspected,
dangerous person.

Officer Mitchell's knowledge of facts

regarding someone named "Orlando Roybal" was irrelevant to a
consideration of the reasonableness of the frisk of a person
the officer did not know to be Orlando Roybal.

As far as the

officer knew at the time of the frisk, the suspect was an
unidentified stranger.

Simply because an unidentified person

is in the vicinity of an earlier wrong-doing is not sufficient
reason to justify a warrantless frisk.

State v. Swanigan, 699

P.2d 718 (Utah 1985).
Furthermore, as noted above, the Court's opinion
correctly states that an officer must point to "specific and
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articulable" facts in order to justify a frisk.

In other

words, an officer cannot base such a search on guesswork or
hunches.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
In this case, the search of Mr. Roybal was a product

of guesswork.

The officer who conducted the search testified:
Q. And those are the considerations
that you took when you decided to do
the pat down search; is that correct?
A.

For the most part, correct.

Q.

Was there anything else?

A. Yes. But it was, again, sixth
sense. Just a feeling.
Q.

Just a hunch on your part?

A.

Yes.

(T. 28).
The officer's testimony is clear —
Mr. Roybal.

a hunch led to the frisk of

However, an officer's hunch is not enough to pass

constitutional muster.

In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, at

64 (1968) the Supreme Court stated:

"The police officer is not

entitled to seize and search every person whom he sees on the
street or of whom he makes inquiries.

Before he places a hand

on the person of a citizen in search of anything, he must have
constitutionally adequate, reasonable grounds for doing so." A
hunch is not "constitutionally adequate, reasonable grounds" to
conduct a frisk.
In conclusion, the State failed to justify a
warrantless frisk of Mr. Roybal by the officer.

The officer

did not know the identity of the man he was frisking, a crucial
factor.

Further, the officer did not testify as to specific
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and articulable facts which would warrant a frisk.

Rather, a

hunch formed the basis for the warrantless search.

The trial

court erred in refusing to suppress the fruits of that search.
CONCLUSION
Because this Court misapprehended critical issues in
its decision in this case, the Appellant respectfully petitions
this Court to reconsider that decision and reverse his
conviction and remand his case for a new trial or dismissal.
Respectfully submitted this ^

day of March, 1986.

LYNN R. BROWN
Attorney for Petitioner

I, LYNN R. BROWN, hereby certify that four copies of
the foregoing were delivered to the Attorney General's Office,
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
this

t

day of March, 1986.
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CERTIFICATION
I, LYNN R. BROWN, do hereby certify the following:
1.

I am the attorney for

appellant/petitioner in this case and;
2.

This Petition for Rehearing is presented

to this Court in good faith and not to delay any matter in this
case.
Respectfully submitted this ,-•;'

day of March, 1986.
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LiNN R. BROWN
Attorney/Petitioner
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